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DISCRIMINATION OUTSIDE OF THE OFFICE:
WHERE TO DRAW THE WALLS OF THE WORKPLACE FOR A
"HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT" CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII
DOUGLAS R. GARMAGER*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states, "It shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."' Consider three scenarios in the context of today's work-
place: (1) two or more employees travel to a location outside of the tradi-
tional corporate headquarters as a requirement or consequence of their
jobs. 2 While traveling, the employees spend their evening at a hotel and
may accompany each other for a meal, entertainment, or perhaps meet each
other for company in one of their rooms. 3 During this "personal" time, one
employee assaults, verbally harasses, or performs some other affirmative
act towards the other employee which is interpreted as a hostile gesture. 4
(2) Two or more employees attend a gathering as a social obligation re-
quired either expressly or implicitly by the company for which they work.5
The gathering occurs off the premises of the corporate office or headquar-
ters. 6 At this gathering, one of the employees inappropriately touches or
makes verbal remarks that the other views as a hostile gesture. 7 (3) During
the course of employment, a friendly relationship develops between two
employees who make contact outside of work and occasionally get together
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2010; I would
like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Mary Rose Strubbe, and my Notes and Comments editor,
Dan Mullenix, for their guidance as I wrote this note. Additionally, I want to thank my wife Katharine
Coombes and my family for all their support throughout my law school education. Lastly, I would like
to thank Chicago-Kent and the Chicago-Kent Law Review for providing me with such wonderful
opportunities and the education to take advantage of them.
I. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
2. E.g., Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 131-34 (2d Cir. 2001).
3. E.g., id.
4. E.g., id.
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for entertainment. 8 At work, one of those employees begins making unset-
tling comments which causes discomfort to the other employee. 9 Eventu-
ally, this conduct escalates outside of work hours when that employee
shows up at the other's private residence and engages in harassing con-
duct. 10
Certainly, the circumstance in which each of these situations develops
would be familiar to many, whereas the result would fortunately be a rare
occurrence. Many courts properly consider this conduct, which occurred
outside of working hours and the physical confines of the office, as relevant
to a hostile work environment claim under Title VII."I However, one court
recently noted a circuit split on the issue of whether conduct occurring
outside the workplace should be considered in a hostile work environment
case. 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Gow-
esky v. Singing River Hospital Systems, stated that "a harassment claim, to
be cognizable, must affect a person's working environment."' 13 The Court
found that the cases cited by the plaintiff referred to "harassment in the
workplace" and dismissed her claim of harassment based on offensive
comments made, both over the phone and in writing, while she was on
leave for treatment of a disease. 14 Similarly, another court dismissed con-
duct outside the workplace on the basis that "[g]enerally, hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment is 'unwelcome sexual conduct in the
workplace.'""15
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that "harassment does not have to take place within the physical con-
fines of the workplace to be actionable; it need only have consequences in
the workplace."' 16 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
8. E.g., Cromer-Kendall v. District of Columbia, 326 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 2004).
9. E.g., id.
10. E.g., id.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006); Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 137 (2d
Cir. 2001) (involving a similar fact pattern to situation 1); Cromer-Kendall, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59
(involving a similar fact pattern to situation 3); Parrish, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53 (involving a similar
fact pattern to situation 2).
12. Reed v. Airtran Airways, 531 F. Supp. 2d 660, 670 n.17 (D. Md. 2008).
13. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 2003). Despite this lan-
guage's suggestion that conduct outside the workplace could be relevant to the extent it "affectfs] a
person's working environment," the Court primarily distinguished the conduct on the questionable basis
that most communications were not made while both parties were present in the workplace and that the
plaintiff "never returned to work," even though the plaintiff "maintained staff privileges and continued
to attend monthly staff meetings." Id. at 506, 510-11.
14. Id. at 510-11.
15. Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:05-CV-734, 2007 WL 1141492, at *12 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 17, 2007) (quoting Pepperman v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 197097, 1997 WL 33339576, at
*2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1997)).
16. Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008).
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First Circuit explained that it "permit[s] evidence of non-workplace con-
duct to help determine the severity and pervasiveness of the hostility in the
workplace."' 17 The absence of a position by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit creates even more uncertainty in the law con-
ceming this issue.18
This note discusses whether courts should consider conduct outside
the workplace when determining hostile work environment claims under
Title VII by: (1) examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for guidance; (2) providing an overview of the judicial development
of hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the different ways
in which courts have addressed conduct outside the workplace within that
framework; and lastly, (3) recommending a test for when courts confront
the issue of conduct outside the workplace.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides little
information or guidance from Congress for determining the boundaries of
the workplace. The debate over the Act took shape as a political/regional
battle in Congress, one in which the fundamental principle of Civil Rights
became the focal point rather than practical application and enforcement
for the future. 19 Much of the debate focused on the bill's urgent purpose of
opening up America's workplaces to African Americans, 20 and even the
amendment adding "sex" as a protected category was an attempt to defeat
the bill, rather than to provide substantive protection. 21 As a result, work-
place "harassment" never entered the discussion, and therefore judicial
development of Title VII must fill this gap. A brief overview of the passage
of Title VII will reveal why the statute is silent on the issue of conduct
outside the workplace, and why judicial development of Title VII is neces-
17. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409 (1st Cir. 2002).
18. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cit. 2008).
19. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985) [hereinafter LONGEST DEBATE].
20. H.R. Rep. No. 914 (1963), reprinted in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM'N,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2026, 2147-49 (1964).
According to a Department of Labor report, in 1962, 4.6 percent of white males were unemployed
compared to elevent percent of non-white males. And, of those who were working, whites composed
47.3 percent of the white-collar workforce, whereas non-white workers composed only 16.7 percent.
These statistics, in combination with the additional views of several House Judiciary Committee mem-
bers that "failure of our society to extend job opportunities to the Negro is an economic waste" along
with the bill's stated purpose of "eliminat[ing] ... discrimination in employment," leads to the conclu-
sion that at the time the bill was introduced, it primarily addressed inequality in access to the workplace
along with the entire range of economic opportunity within it. H.R. Rep. No. 914.




Opposition to civil rights can be seen in the early tactical maneuvering
by the bill's proponents to get the bill to the House floor. On June 20, 1963,
Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) introduced the bill that would
eventually become The Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the House of Represen-
tatives.22 When the bill entered the Judiciary Committee, Celler assigned it
to a subcommittee which he chaired. 23 Upon the completion of hearings,
Subcommittee Chairman Celler introduced "a vastly strengthened bill" to
the House Judiciary Committee, the intent being to create "'trading pur-
poses' with the southern Democrats and conservative Republicans who sat
on the full committee" and to preserve the bill's purpose by maintaining
moderate measures and "trading" more controversial measures. 24 As ex-
pected, the bill outraged many on the Judiciary Committee and, before
passing, required the political "patching" for which the strengthened bill
was created.25 The bill encountered another obstacle as it entered the Rules
Committee, chaired by Howard "Judge" Smith, who "[t]hrough the
years ... imposed his will on the nation by stopping, delaying, or watering
down progressive legislation in such fields as civil rights."'26 Smith's at-
tempt to defeat the bill in committee failed, however.27 Republicans and
Democrats on the committee threatened to "strip [Judge Smith] of the bill,"
and he eventually allowed a vote, which resulted in the bill's passage by
the Rules Committee. 28
Although the bill reached the floor of the House for debate, it was
during the amendments phase that Judge Smith rose with "the trump card
he had been waiting so long to play."'29 Judge Smith offered an amendment
adding "sex" as a protected category to the bill.30 Smith offered the
amendment for the purpose of defeating the bill by making it too contro-
versial for passage.31 However, a group of female representatives in the
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 31, 37.
25. Id. at 38-39, 42. The report issued by the House Judiciary Committee, in its "General State-
ment," acknowledged the reasons for which the bill was being considered, by explaining that it ad-
dressed "discrimination against some minority groups... [particularly] discrimination against
Negroes." Under the statement referring explicitly to Title VII, the House Report expressed the desired
effect of Title VII on employment as "eliminatfing] ... discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, or national origin." H.R. Rep. No. 914.
26. LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 19, at 84.
27. Id. at 99.
28. Id. at 98-99.
29. Id. at 115.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 116.
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House lauded this amendment as a "logical" addition to the bill.32 The re-
sult of the amendment adding "sex" hardly accomplished Judge Smith's
purpose of defeating the bill, and instead, "broadened and strengthened"
it.33 The House voted 290-130 in favor of the bill.34
Representative Cellar's maneuvers in the Judiciary Committee, Judge
Smith's defeated attempt to stop the bill in the Rules Committee, and his
later attempt to defeat the bill by expanding civil rights to encompass
"sex," all demonstrate the stark divide separating Southern Democrats from
civil rights legislation.35 These tactical measures portray a political body
with a fundamental difference in ideology, with each side worried less
about practical considerations of the bill than about defeating or approving
the basic concept of civil rights. Within this legislative milieu, no debate or
report from the House even uses the words "hostile work environment," let
alone reveals any information on how far the workplace extends for a hos-
tile work environment claim.
In the Senate, the bill's proponents expected opposition in the form of
a filibuster by the Southerners. 36 However, the bill first needed to be ma-
neuvered through a potentially hostile committee phase and reach the floor
for debate. 37 In order to bypass the Judiciary Committee, chaired by James
Eastland of Mississippi, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield proposed
to place the bill on the calendar, a procedural tactic resulting in circumven-
tion of committee action.38 Because this calendar measure received a ma-
jority vote, the bill never went to committee in the Senate. 39 As debate
began, the bill's proponents picked out Senate Minority Leader Everett
Dirksen, a Republican, whose "civil rights stand at that time was ambiva-
lent," as the key to obtaining the Republican votes necessary to stop the
Southerners' "inevitable filibuster."'40 After extensive negotiations, Senator
Dirksen declared the bill "perfectly satisfactory" and delivered the essential
32. Id. at 117. In justifying support for the amendment to add "sex" as a protected category,
Representative Griffiths stated that otherwise the bill would "take colored men and colored women and
give them equal employment rights, and down at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman
with no rights at all." The fear reflected in this comment was that an African-American woman's rights
would trump a white woman's rights in getting a particular job, rather than concern about working in an
environment free from sexual harassment. 110 CONG. REc. 2579 (1964).
33. LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 19, at 121.
34. Id.
35. See id. passim.
36. Id. at 124.
37. Id. at 132.
38. Id. Although this was atypical, Mansfield stated that "the reason for unusual procedures [is]
too well known to require elaboration," implying that it would be buried in committee by the southern
chairman. Id.
39. Id. at 135.
40. d. at 153.
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Republican votes.41 The Senate voted 71-29 to invoke cloture, and later, a
substitute bill passed the Senate by a vote of 73-27.42 After the Senate bill
passed the House, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights bill
into law on July 2, 1964.
43
In the Senate, the political/regional division on the issue of Civil
Rights further played out more as a difference in fundamental principle,
than as a battle over the details of future application. 44 As a result of Sena-
tor Mansfield's calendar measure, the bill's presence in the Senate pro-
duced no committee report providing guidance on the issue of harassment
inside or outside the workplace. 45 Furthermore, debate in the Senate never
touched on harassment either; in most instances, the discussion concerned
the specifics of proposed amendments. The use of tactics such as the fili-
buster, bypassing of committees, and reliance on Senator Dirksen's ap-
proval of the bill to deliver votes often overrode discussion on important
issues concerning Civil Rights in the workplace.
Thus, Title VII's remedial purpose of ending workplace discrimina-
tion never fully developed within the legislature, and with respect to con-
duct outside the workplace, is completely silent. It is therefore necessary to
examine the judicial development of hostile work environment claims and,
specifically, court opinions addressing the issue of conduct outside the
workplace.
II. JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE "HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT" CLAIM
A. United States Supreme Court Development of the "Hostile Work
Environment" Claim
The Supreme Court recognized "hostile work environment" claims in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson by rejecting the argument that in enacting
Title VII, "the focus has been on tangible, economic barriers erected by
discrimination. '46 Broadly interpreting Title VII, the Court stated that
"[t]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a
congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
41. Id. at 166-87.
42. Id. at 199, 215. At the time, this was the longest Senate filibuster in United States history: 534
hours, 1 minute, and 51 seconds. Id. at 200.
43. Id. at 228.
44. See id. passim.
45. See id. at 132.
46. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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of men and women' and expanded the statute to cover psychological inju-
ries as well. 47 After analyzing regulations promulgated by the EEOC, the
Court held that sexual harassment can be proven by showing that "dis-
crimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment."'48 The Court held that to state a claim of sexual harassment, the
conduct "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive work environment.' 49
The Supreme Court clarified the test for meeting the severe or perva-
sive requirement in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.50 After reaffirming
Meritor, the Court created a two-part test requiring that conduct be hostile
under both an objective and subjective standard.51 Under the objective and
subjective standards, a hostile work environment "can be determined only
by looking at all the circumstances.' 52 The Court provided factors for es-
tablishing the objective standard, including "the frequency of the discrimi-
natory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance. '53 Furthermore, the
Court recognized effects relevant to a hostile work environment claim be-
yond those set forth in Meritor, including "discourag[ing] employees from
remaining on the job, or keep[ing] them from advancing in their careers." '
54
In effect, Harris lowered the damage requirement for a hostile work envi-
ronment claim to include effects that would not necessarily be "psycho-
logically injurious" but that would have a significant effect on a person's
employment.5 5 Following Harris, the Court eventually expanded sexual
harassment to include "same-sex harassment" in the workplace.
56
Although the Court refused the opportunity to set out a test for em-
ployer liability in Meritor,57 the issue, with regard to supervisors, reached
the Court in two separate opinions issued simultaneously in 1998: Burling-
47. Id. (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
48. Id. at 65-66.
49. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
50. 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
53. Id. Notably, none of these factors distinguish the location or time in which discrimination must
occur.
54. Id. at 22.
55. See id.
56. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) ("[Mlale-on-male
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover rea-
sonably comparable evils ... ").
57. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
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ton Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.58 The
necessity for releasing two separate opinions resulted from a distinction
between two forms of harassment, "quid pro quo" and "hostile work envi-
ronment. ' 59 Quid pro quo harassment involves "threats [by the supervisor]
to retaliate ... if... denied some sexual liberties." 60 Hostile work envi-
ronment claims involve "bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are
sufficiently severe or pervasive. ' 61 For purposes of employer liability, Jus-
tice Kennedy noted that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile
work environment harassment provides nothing more than a "helpful" way
of classifying the type of conduct leading to a sexual harassment claim and
does not involve a difference in the strength of the claim, the test applied,
or the remedy. 62
In both Ellerth and Faragher, the Court based the standard for em-
ployer liability on agency principles, but limited vicarious liability to "not
make employers 'automatically liable for sexual harassment by their super-
visors.' 63 The Court's acceptance of agency principles for employer liabil-
ity derived from the definition of "employer" in Title VII, which includes
"agents," and from lower court opinions both supporting employer liability
because of "assist[ance] in [the supervisor's] misconduct by the supervi-
sory relationship" and rejecting employer liability for being "outside the
scope of employment. '64 Consequently, the Court held that where a super-
visor "with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the em-
ployee" takes a "tangible employment action," the employer will be
vicariously liable for a hostile work environment. 65 However, absent a
"tangible employment action," the Court permits the employer to raise an
affirmative defense that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly" the conduct and that the employee "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer."'66 On the issue of employer liability for harassment by co-
workers, the Supreme Court, without holding on the issue, noted that the
trend of federal appellate courts is to impose liability "under a negligence
58. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
59. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751 (addressing "quid pro quo" harassment); Faragher, 524 U.S. at
786-87 (addressing "hostile work environment" harassment).
60. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 751-54.
63. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986)); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-56.
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-803; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
65. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
66. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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B. Lower Court Opinions Addressing the Issue of Conduct Outside the
Workplace
Because the Supreme Court has not yet confronted the issue of con-
duct outside the workplace, lower federal courts continue to release a wide
range of opinions both considering such conduct as well as dismissing it.
Furthermore, the courts that do consider conduct outside the workplace
have inconsistent methods for determining the boundaries of the work-
place. In fact, some of those courts overlook the fundamental purpose of
Title VII and Supreme Court guidance. For instance, one court implicitly
recognized a distinction between supervisor and non-supervisor conduct
when defining the boundaries of the workplace when it stated that "other
courts have held that generally an employer is not liable for the harassment
or other unlawful conduct perpetrated by a non-supervisory employee after
work hours and away from the workplace setting. ' 68 A distinction between
supervisor and non-supervisor conduct outside the workplace confuses the
issue, however, by determining the legitimacy of any hostility on the basis
of an employment hierarchy, a result that impairs Title VII protections
against "'the entire spectrum of disparate treatment.' ' 69 An analysis of
cases on both sides of the issue of whether conduct outside the workplace is
relevant to a hostile work environment claim reveals the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each side's positions.
1. Outside Conduct Not Considered in a Hostile Work Environment
Claim
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to consider conduct out-
side the workplace in Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.70 In Sprague, the
plaintiff worked as a "market analyst" for the defendant-company. 71 Over a
period of sixteen months, a supervisor made remarks which the plaintiff
found to be discriminatory.72 At the plaintiffs wedding reception, the su-
pervisor looked down her dress and commented, "[W]ell, you got to get it
67. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
68. Duggins v. Steak 'N Shake, Inc., 3 F. App'x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
69. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
70. 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 1359.
72. Id. at 1366. The supervisor made comments such as: "you really need to undo that top button";
"Hey, you can't call them girls. You have to call them ladies"; and "you know how they are at that time
of the month." Id.
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when you can."' 73 The plaintiff expressed her reaction as being "so uncom-
fortable and... so embarrassed that [she] didn't even tell [her] husband for
a few weeks."'74 The Court admitted that "[t]he incident at [the] wedding
reception was the most serious"; however, it explained that "[the conduct]
occurred at a private club, not in the workplace. '75 In conclusion, the Court
held that the defendant's comments did not meet the threshold of severity
or pervasiveness required for a hostile work environment.
76
In Sprague, the Court failed to analyze the effect of the alleged con-
duct at the wedding, but instead dismissed it entirely because it occurred
off the work premises. 77 The potential importance of the conduct at the
wedding, had it been considered in the Court's conclusion, is unclear-the
Court characterized most of the defendant's remarks as merely "unpleasant
and boorish" and noted that "the conduct occurred sporadically over an
extended period. '78 Regardless, the conclusion in Sprague is unsatisfactory
because the plaintiff was unable to have a right enforced because the de-
fendant fortuitously engaged in the most serious conduct at a wedding re-
ception, and the Court offered no legitimate support for this result.
Additionally, the Court failed to comprehend that hostility can accumulate
with each act of harassment, regardless of location, to the extent that the
cumulative hostility accompanies less-serious workplace comments and
even the potentially ominous presence of the harasser in the workplace. 79
Although the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet de-
cided the issue, one district court within the circuit held that off-premises
conduct should not be considered.80 In Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek,
the plaintiff, a "forensic evidence technician," engaged in a sexual relation-
ship with a police sergeant for the city, who was not her supervisor.81 The
plaintiff alleged that the relationship eventually resulted in unwanted sexual
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. The plaintiff was further disadvantaged by filing her case prior to the employer liability
rules set out in Ellerth and Faragher. Under Ellerth/Faragher, the plaintiff may have prevailed because
allegedly "management was aware of at least three of the[] incidents... [and] refused to remedy the
situation by placing [the plaintiff] with a different supervisor." Id. at 1365; see Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
79. E.g., Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409-10 (1st Cir. 2002)
("[lI]nteractions ... outside of work help explain why [the plaintiff] was so frightened... and why [the
defendant's] constant presence around [the plaintiff] at work created a hostile work environment.").
80. See Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:05-CV-734, 2007 WL 1141492, at *12 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 17, 2007).
81. Id. at *1.
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acts, but it never physically entered the workplace. 82 However, in one in-
stance, another employee witnessed the sergeant take a fastener out of the
plaintiffs hair and informed a supervisor that the plaintiff did not approve
of the sergeant's behavior.83 The supervisor spoke with the sergeant and,
afterward, witnessed no further incidents of unwanted touching.84 While
the plaintiff waited for an offer from the city police force, other officers
suggested that the plaintiff did not have "the right personality for a police
officer."'85 After the plaintiff accepted a job with a county police force, she
claimed that the sergeant had raped her.86 The District Court for the West-
ern District of Michigan dismissed this conduct, finding that sexual har-
assment involves 'unwelcome sexual conduct in the workplace.'"87
The Diepenhorst Court also fails to provide adequate rationale for
dismissing off-premises conduct. The Court noted that the plaintiff con-
ceded that the sexual acts "occurred outside of the workplace."'88 In refus-
ing to consider conduct occurring off the work premises, the Court, unlike
Sprague, cited to another court for authority, which at least provides the
appearance of legitimacy. 89 Still, the Court invariably applied the work-
place distinction to eliminate the adequacy of the claim. 90 Although the
Court addresses the claim's unlikelihood of success without the rule, the
early dismissal of the conduct shows that the Court was reluctant to seri-
ously consider the conduct's true severity.91
Similarly, in an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals acknowledged that "other courts have held that generally an employer
is not liable for the harassment or other unlawful conduct perpetrated by a
non-supervisory employee after work hours and away from the workplace
setting." 92 However, the Court also accepted, "[W]hen an employee is
forced to work for.., someone who is harassing her outside the workplace,
the employee may reasonably perceive the work environment to be hos-
tile."' 93 In this case, the fourteen-year-old plaintiff, an employee of the de-





86. Id. at *2.
87. Id. at *12 (quoting Pepperman v. Gen. Motors, Corp., No. 197097, 1997 WL 33339576, at *2
(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1997)).
88. Id.
89. See id. (quoting Pepperman, 1997 WL 33339576, at *2).
90. Id.
91. See id.




another Steak 'N Shake location. 94 While at the party, the plaintiff drank
alcohol and alleged that, after the party, the trainer raped her before driving
her home. 95 A rumor of the incident came to the attention of the company's
human resources department, but the plaintiff's mother refused to discuss it
with them. 96 No criminal charges were ever filed against the trainer.97 The
Court found most determinative the fact that these two employees "never
worked together either before or after the alleged rape."'98 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the "[p]laintiff has failed to show that the alleged
rape... created a hostile work environment." 99
The Fifth Circuit has also applied the workplace distinction while
offering little support for the rule. In Gowesky v. Singing River Hospital
Systems, an Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") case, the plaintiff
contracted hepatitis C while working for the defendant. 100 As a result, she
stopped working but continued to attend staff meetings for two years while
she received treatment. 101 After successful treatment, the plaintiff ap-
proached an administrator at the hospital and expressed her desire to re-
turn. 102 The administrator stated "that he didn't think that [the plaintiff]
could work in the Emergency Room with hepatitis C, that he wouldn't go
to a dentist with hepatitis C and he would not let [the plaintiff] suture his
child."']03 The plaintiffs immediate supervisor also required "that she
would be able to do the work, and that she would not be infec-
tious.... [The supervisor also questioned her] on whether she knew of any
other emergency room physicians with hepatitis C."'1 04 The plaintiff alleged
further "offensive remarks" and eventually sought legal representation after
receiving a notice which she interpreted as a termination of her employ-
ment. 105 Although this was an ADA case, ostensibly the Court would apply
the same holding under Title VII because it referred to "'harassment' under
the ADA or its model, Title VII. ' 1°6
94. Id. at 305-06.
95. Id. at 306.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 311.
99. Id.
100. Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003). Gowesky is repre-
sentative of the circuit split regarding whether conduct outside the workplace is relevant to a hostile
work environment claim. See Reed v. Airtran Airways, 531 F. Supp. 2d 660, 670 n. 17 (D. Md. 2008).




105. Id. at 507.
106. Id. at 510.
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The Court stated that "a harassment claim, to be cognizable, must
affect a person's working environment."'10 7 The Court found that the cases
cited by the plaintiff referred to "harassment in the workplace" and dis-
missed her claim. 108 The Gowesky opinion attempts to provide a rational
basis for distinguishing between "in the workplace" and outside the work-
place but ignores facts germane to the issue. The Court emphasizes that the
plaintiff "never returned to work" and that the conversations "occurred via
telephone or in writing."'109 However, the plaintiff still "maintained staff
privileges and continued to attend monthly staff meetings."' "l 0 The facts
show that the employment relationship continued, just under uncommon
circumstances. The Court, however, annuls the employment relationship
with artificial distinctions, such as that the plaintiffs communications with
her supervisors did not occur face-to-face and that she never returned to
full work-capacity. 11' By severing comments made in the context of a pure
employment relationship from that relationship, the Court engenders a dis-
turbing result: it overlooks potential discrimination in the workplace.
In these cases, the range of analysis runs from completely lacking any
policy consideration or reasoning to requiring the presence of hodge-
podge-and sometimes irrelevant-factual connections to the workplace,
all of which overlook the underlying hostility in the workplace. The deci-
sions imply that the "workplace" can be isolated from events occurring
outside its boundaries. To do so, these courts consistently emphasize facts
that distance conduct from the physical boundaries of the workplace, with-
out looking at the overwhelming psychological impact the conduct may
have within it. Furthermore, these courts provide no substantive discussion
of the purposes of Title VII or the actual effects in the workplace.
2. Courts Considering Conduct Outside the Workplace
In Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit addressed a defendant's claim that the district court abused
its discretion when it permitted evidence of conduct outside the workplace
in a hostile work environment case. 112 The plaintiff claimed that while
working for the defendant, a co-employee harassed her in a number of
ways.' 1 3 The harassment involved unwelcome and improper touching,
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 511.
110. Id. at 506.
111. See id. at511.
112. Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409 (1st Cir. 2002).
113. Id. at 392.
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stalking, and eventually a break-in at the plaintiff s home. 114 The defendant
filed a motion in limine seeking to have evidence of conduct outside the
workplace excluded.11 5  However, the Court acknowledged that
"[c]ourts... do permit evidence of non-workplace conduct to help deter-
mine the severity and pervasiveness of the hostility in the workplace." 116
The Court supported this statement by citing another First Circuit case
involving sexual harassment in which the Court admitted evidence of
"crank phone calls." 117 The Court noted that evidence of conduct outside
the workplace "explain[s] why she was so frightened... and why his con-
stant presence around her at work created a hostile work environment." 118
Thus, the Court acknowledged the relevance of conduct outside the work-
place when addressing the hostility present in the workplace. 119 The infer-
ence from the Court's statement is that the Court was concerned that
limiting evidence to conduct in the workplace would hinder application of
Title VII by excusing the workplace effects that the statute aims to elimi-
nate. 120
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the issue
of conduct outside the workplace in Lapka v. Chertoff but, in a different
approach than Crowley, viewed the workplace through a modern lens. 121 In
Lapka, the plaintiff attended a training session in Georgia as a requirement
of her employment with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS"). 122 The plaintiff met other trainees at a bar and became intoxi-
cated. 123 While at the bar, the plaintiff danced with another employee of
INS who made "sexual advances" and eventually gave the plaintiff a ride to
her hotel. 124 When the employee dropped the plaintiff off at her hotel room,
he sexually assaulted the plaintiff. 125 A local hospital subsequently treated
the plaintiff for alcohol poisoning, and plaintiff informed hospital staff of
the possibility that she was a victim of date rape. 126 The plaintiff reported
the events to the training center, which called the police and conducted its
114. Id.
115. Id. at 409.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 724 (1st Cir. 2001)).
118. Id. at 409-10.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008).
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own investigation before sending a report to INS. 127 When the accused
employee began showing up at the plaintiff's place of employment and her
supervisors did not react promptly to her concerns, the plaintiff obtained an
order of protection. 128 The plaintiff continued requesting, to no avail, that
her supervisors contact the accused employee and prohibit him from the
building. 129 Eventually, the plaintiff began receiving assignments that she
believed were the result of retaliation by her supervisors. 1
30
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that outside, off-hours
conduct should not be considered and stated that "harassment does not have
to take place within the physical confines of the workplace to be action-
able; it need only have consequences in the workplace."'131 The Court also
acknowledged, "The [training] facility is different from a typical workplace
where 'employees go home at the close of their normal workday."' 1 32 The
Court's analysis focused on the fact that the employer provided the hotel,
training, and cafeteria, and that "[e]mployees in these situations can be
expected to 'band together for society and socialize as a matter of
course.' 1 33 The Lapka Court recognized that in circumstances such as the
INS's training facility, the traditional definition of the workplace col-
lapses. 134 Analyzing the case with a flexible understanding of the work-
place, the Court adapted Title VII to encompass real situations where the
conduct cannot be isolated from the workplace. 135 The Court concluded
that under the "severe or pervasive" test, the assault alone could meet the
severity option, but that the frequent visits by the alleged harasser would
also give rise to a claim under the pervasive option.
136
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Parrish v. Sollecito, provided the most comprehensive, well-
reasoned analysis of the boundaries of the workplace. In Parrish, the plain-
tiff worked for two car dealerships with the position of "finance and in-
come manager."' 137 The General Manager of one of the dealerships began
127. Id.
128. Id. at 980.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 983.
132. Id. (quoting Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)).
133. Id. (quoting Ferris, 277 F.3dat 135).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 983-84. The Court noted that the pervasiveness option triggers because "[t]he continued
presence of a rapist in the victim's workplace can render the workplace objectively hostile because the
rapist's presence exacerbates and reinforces the severe fear and anxiety suffered by the victim." Id. at
984. The court later denied the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim on other grounds. Id. at 985.
137. Parrish v. Sollecito, 249 F. Supp. 2d 342, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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harassing the plaintiff during a meeting by putting his hand under the plain-
tiff s skirt and "reaching close to her groin" when two others were pre-
sent. 138 The plaintiff reported the incident to the owner of the dealership
who "[made] light of the matter" by saying that he "would break [the Gen-
eral Manager's] fingers if he touches you like that."'139 The General Man-
ager repeated the conduct two more times, with the same employees
present. 140 The Office Manager recorded all these incidents. 141 In the
fourth alleged incident, the General Manager repeated the same conduct,
but this time at a funeral reception for the dealership owner's father. 142 The
plaintiff subsequently reported the incident to the owner, who said he
would discuss it with the General Manager, but never did so. 14 3 Following
this incident, the General Manager continued to engage in inappropriate
behavior and instructed the sales staff to not cooperate with the plaintiff. 144
Eventually, the owner and General Manager terminated the plaintiff s em-
ployment. 145 Because the only incident falling within 300 days of the plain-
tiffs filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") was the incident at the funeral reception, the issue before the
Court was whether conduct outside the workplace was relevant to a hostile
work environment claim.1
46
The Court began its analysis under the proposition that it was "aware
of no settled law that... allow[ed] a harasser to pick and choose the venue
for his assaults so as to not account for those that occur physically outside
the workplace."' 147 As a result, it explained that "[t]he proper focus of sex-
ual harassment jurisprudence is not on any particular point in time or coor-
dinate location that rigidly affixes the employment relationship, but on the
manifest conduct associated with it, on whether the employer has created a
hostile or abusive 'work environment. '"l48 Similar to Lapka, the Court
recognized that the employment relationship "often carries beyond the
work station's physical bounds and regular hours" and noted that "the pre-
vailing attitudes and perceptions" of the office may be manifested outside
138. Id. at 345.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 345-46.
141. Id.




146. Id. at 347.
147. Id. at 350-51.
148. Id. at 351.
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the office into other arenas. 149 Furthermore, the Court expanded on a strict
definition of work functions by including "social events" and explaining
that other confrontations may not be "compelled by a business purpose,
but.., the employment relationship may necessarily carry over by reason
of circumstances that may have their origins in the workplace itself." 50
Under this framework, the Court viewed the workplace "holistically"
by providing for a "constructive extension of the work environment" where
the employer permitted harassing conduct in the workplace, which pro-
vided those engaging in the harassing conduct with "license" to continue
outside the workplace. 151 It noted that "often such outside misbehavior
rebounds and transposes its consequences inside the actual workplace it-
self."'152 Admirably, the Court viewed the circumstances through the effect
on the victim, stating that whereas the harasser may "dismiss an act of har-
assment because it allegedly happened beyond the workplace, the victim
may not have the equal aplomb to leave the matter behind."'153 In summa-
tion, the Court stated that "the centripetal bond that pulls the co-workers'
lives around the same work orbit remains what it is wherever their common
employment relation may proximately extend."' 154 The Court held that be-
cause the incident at the funeral was an "ordinary and necessary social
obligation[]," the incident could support a jury finding of a hostile work
environment. 155
C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Policy on Hostile Work
Environments
Under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress gave administrative
authority to the EEOC "to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural
regulations to carry out the provisions [of the act].' 56 EEOC guidelines
provide some guidance regarding conduct occurring outside the workplace.
The Code of Federal Regulations provides a definition of sexual harass-
ment that includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 157 When




152. Id. at 352.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 352-53.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006).
157. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2009).
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the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred," which is consistent with the majority opinion in Harris.158
However, the regulations clarify that between co-employees, "an employer
is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer. .. knows or should have known of the conduct." 159
On the EEOC's website, the document titled "Policy Guidance on
Current Issues of Sexual Harassment" contains no references to conduct
outside the workplace, and the last update was on June 21, 1999.160 The
regulation on sexual harassment also appears to cover employer liability for
racial harassment, as the EEOC compliance manual for race-based hostile
work environment matters cites to the regulation on sexual harassment
(§ 1604.11) and the "Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harass-
ment." 161 Thus, the EEOC guidelines provide direction consistent with the
judicial development of a hostile work environment. The correlation be-
tween the regulations promulgated by the EEOC and Harris, Ellerth, and
Faragher, as well as the absence of an express position on whether conduct
outside the workplace should be considered, suggest that the Commission
and the U.S. Supreme Court develop in tandem and have not yet addressed
this issue.
III. ExPANsIoN OF THE WORKPLACE WITHIN THE ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
FRAMEWORK
A. Courts should consider conduct outside the workplace in "hostile
work environment'" claims.
Judicial development of the hostile work environment cause of action
and the logic of courts considering conduct outside the workplace provide a
strong basis for expanding the workplace definition beyond the traditional
concept of "the office." Such an expansion would encompass modem no-
tions of the workplace, including social obligations, travel requirements,
off-premises business meetings, off-premises team-building events, and
other social encounters. The attempt to separate employment-related events
from the "workplace" represents a judicial disconnect from reality because
for the majority of Americans, such events constitute normal occurrences
158. Id. § 1604.1 l(b); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993).
159. Id. § 1604.11 (d) (emphasis added).
160. See EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment (Mar. 19, 1990),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html.
161. See EEOC, EEOC Compliance Manual Section 15: Race & Color Discrimination (Apr. 19,
2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html.
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and requirements of employment.
By adopting the view of more progressive courts-those that consider
conduct outside the workplace-Title VII will provide necessary employee
protections while also producing and sustaining an efficient workforce.
162
Court enforcement of Title VII with respect to conduct outside the work-
place will incentivize employer precautions for the prospective actions of
supervisors and employees, who may engage in discriminatory behavior,
with the elimination of economic waste. 163 Economic waste may take the
form of emotionally distraught employees with little motivation to perform
well or be productive, supervisors and co-employees who may be spending
work time engaging in harassment, and any collateral effect of harassment
taking the form of unhappy workers involved in these situations or dis-
heartened by the conduct itself and suffering lost productivity as a result. 164
Responsible employers must view hostile work environments primarily as
economic waste and be concerned with these costly effects.
Statistics of sexual harassment claims show a significant amount of
conduct outside the workplace being litigated. In 2007, the EEOC received
27,112 charges of harassment and resolved 22,572 of the claims, with the
majority of charges-12,5 10-based on Sexual Harassment. 165 The EEOC
brought 268 suits under Title VII in 2007.166 Unfortunately, the EEOC
does not provide private litigation statistics or statistics as to incidents oc-
curring outside the workplace. However, one study of federal court opin-
ions betweenl986 and1996 revealed almost 650 opinions based on sexual
harassment. 167 Significantly, in the same study, 114 of the cases, or twenty-
three percent, involved conduct occurring outside the workplace. 168 Fur-
thermore, sixty-nine of the cases, or fourteen percent, exclusively involved
conduct outside the workplace. 169 This survey also notes that of the 114
cases which involved conduct outside the workplace, "about half contain an
employment related event .... Thirty cases involve a nonwork social
162. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
163. Cf Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1311, 1321 (1989) ("As more and more women are employed, the employer's self-interest in curbing
intrigue and harassment, which lowers productivity, grows apace.").
164. See id.
165. EEOC, Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/harassment.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010); EEOC,
Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexualharassment.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
166. EEOC, EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2009,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoclstatistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
167. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 548, 549-50 (2001).
168. Id. at 563.
169. Id.
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event... [and] thirty-five cases ... included nonconsensual, off-premises
conduct, such as phone calls, letters, or visits to the victim's home."'1 70
Clearly these statistics establish that a significant amount of employment-
related harassment involves conduct occurring outside the workplace, and
that plaintiffs consider this conduct serious enough to litigate in federal
courts. 171 Most importantly, though, many courts that fail to consider con-
duct outside the workplace move against the current of the U.S. Supreme
Court and mischaracterize EEOC regulations on sexual harassment. The
courts that disregard conduct outside the workplace often rely primarily on
the phrase "in the workplace" for rejecting a hostile work environment
claim. 172 Nowhere in Title VII does the phrase "in the workplace" appear;
rather, the likely source of this phrase is the Code of Federal Regulations
which states that "an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment
in the workplace" under a negligence standard, which is also recognized in
federal courts. 173 However, this regulation only relates to "fellow employ-
ees," not necessarily supervisors. 174 More importantly, though, the regula-
tion does not negate employer liability for conduct by co-employees
outside the workplace; it is merely silent as to whether off-premises con-
duct should be considered.175 Looking at the entire regulation, which ear-
lier states that "the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at
the totality of the circumstances," the logical conclusion is that the regula-
tions explicitly prescribe employer liability for harassment by a co-
employee under a negligence standard, but in looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the Commission retains the right to bring a potential action
for conduct occurring outside the workplace. 176
The EEOC's conspicuous absence of a position on conduct outside the
workplace corresponds with prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In Harris,
Justice O'Connor not only stated that a hostile work environment requires
"looking at all the circumstances," but also that it is enough that the acts
"discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from ad-
170. Id.
171. Furthermore, legal costs in preparing and engaging in any litigation involving conduct outside
the workplace would be significant for any employers that fail to take adequate precautions against such
conduct.
172. E.g., Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510 (5th Cir. 2003); Sprague v.
Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:05-
CV-734, 2007 WL 1141492, at *12 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2007).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2009) (emphasis added); see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 799 (1998).
174. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
175. See id.
176. See id. § 1604.11(b), (d).
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vancing in their careers." 177 And, in Meritor, Justice Rehnquist noted the
"congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women."' 178 Thus, the Supreme Court clearly interprets Title
VII as a statute aimed at promoting work environments free of discrimina-
tion against protected categories, without specific regard to the origins of
that discrimination. Failing to take note of traumatic, degrading incidents
occurring outside the workplace subverts the direction of the Supreme
Court by distorting its interpretation of the statute's purpose. A barrier to
enforcement of Title VII that legitimizes claims based on the location of
the conduct undermines the statute by permitting the effects of discrimina-
tion against protected classes to remain in the workplace.
Lastly, courts refusing to consider conduct outside the workplace pro-
vide no reasonable analysis as to the policy behind their decision, the pur-
pose of the statute, or the realities of the modem workplace. Some
decisions amount to a recitation of the phrase "in the workplace" along
with a careless dismissal of conduct that would, if occurring "in the work-
place," amount to a gross display of sexual harassment. Other courts re-
quire the existence of vague factual elements that they claim connect
conduct to the employment context, but inherently overlook the hostility in
the workplace. Therefore, the harassed plaintiffs options are to either re-
main working in or remove himself or herself from the discriminatory work
environment--options that do not comport with Title VII protections. The
legitimacy of decisions that leave a harassed plaintiff with no recourse,
because courts-as well as employers-can draw an arbitrary line that
distinguishes the boundaries of the workplace, must be questioned when
compared with the thoughtful analysis of courts that consider conduct out-
side the workplace and the clear direction of the Supreme Court.
B. Courts should embrace Parrish 's logic and extend employer liability
to all interactions between employees.
1. The Parrish Court's Analysis
The Parrish opinion develops an approach for understanding the mod-
em workplace when enforcing Title VII. The Court's opinion addresses the
remedial purpose of Title VII in a manner fully consistent with what most
employees would realistically view as the "work environment" or "work-
place." Following the Court's rationale leads not only to an expanded defi-
177. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
178. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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nition of the workplace, but also to a framework essential to understanding
employee relations and employer liability within the test established by the
Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth and the negligence standard for co-
employees used in the circuits.
The Parrish opinion emphasizes that harassing conduct represents the
central issue of a hostile work environment claim. On this point, the Court
stated that the crux of liability for discrimination is the "manifest conduct"
resulting in a hostile work environment, not merely a time or place that
"rigidly affixes the employment relationship."'179 The Court implicitly ac-
knowledged that phrases such as "outside work hours" or "outside the
workplace" should be viewed as collateral circumstances. 180 By de-
emphasizing these collateral circumstances, the Court shifts the focus of
Title VII away from the mechanical distinctions that doom hostile work
environment claims based on the location of the conduct. And, instead, the
Court recognized that Title VII's purpose of eliminating workplace dis-
crimination cannot be served by focusing on circumstances relating primar-
ily to the "spacial and temporal" aspects of the workplace at the expense of
leaving a hostile work environment in place. 181
As a result, the Court adopted an expansive definition of the work-
place which focused more on the employment relationship than on any
location or time. When defining the workplace, the Court took notice of
specific events such as "business-related meals and social events" as well
as general work events like being "'on the road' or 'in the field."'' 182 It
recognized that the workplace "often carries beyond the work station's
physical bounds and regular hours."'183 The Court justified this expansive
view of the workplace by stating that "the employment relationship
may ... carry over by reason of circumstances that may have their origins
in the workplace itself."'184 By adopting this more expansive view of the
workplace and placing its focus on the conduct leading to a hostile work
environment, the Court sought to effect Title VII's purpose of eliminating
the effects of discrimination in the workplace. This is apparent from the
Court's conclusion, in which it states that "wherever a sexual assault oc-
curs, its consequences may be felt in the victim's 'workplace." ' 185
The Parrish Court followed the Supreme Court's guidance by focus-
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ing exclusively on the harassing conduct and whether that conduct led to a
hostile work environment, which squarely addresses the "congressional
intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women.' ' 186 Moreover, the Court truly viewed "all the circumstances"
when it analyzed the hostile work environment claim. 187 By de-
emphasizing the locus of the conduct, the Court opens its analysis to a vari-
ety of important benefits provided by Title VII, such as generally deterring
discriminatory conduct, keeping the workplace free from discrimination,
and remedying the harmful effects of discrimination on the individual. The
Parrish opinion falls just short of a fully satisfactory solution when it al-
lows for a "constructive extension of the work environment" where the
employer permitted the conduct in the workplace, thereby providing the
harasser with "license to engage in sexual misconduct. .. outside the com-
pany. ' 188 Unfortunately, by requiring that the harassing conduct initially
occur in the workplace before holding the employer liable, the Court con-
tinued to view conduct outside the workplace as a separate category from
conduct inside the workplace.
Regardless, the Parrish Court viewed the work environment "holisti-
cally" and noted that "the centripetal bond that pulls the co-workers' lives
around the same work orbit remains what it is wherever their common em-
ployment relation may proximately extend."' 189 The Court provided little
specific guidance for determining how far an "employment relation may
proximately extend."'190 Its conclusion that the conduct, which took place at
a funeral reception for the employer's father, was part of an "ordinary and
necessary social obligation[]" represents the most helpful indication. 191
However, the Court's general guidance proves helpful in a broader sense.
The Court's statement that "the employment relationship may necessarily
carry over by reason of circumstances that may have their origins in the
workplace itself' suggests that certain circumstances inherently result in
the presence of the employment relationship. 
192
The Parrish Court's proposition that circumstances may inherently
invoke the employment relationship should be extended in defining the
186. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
187. See Parrish, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 351; Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)
("[W]hether an environment is 'hostile' ... can be determined only by looking at all the circum-
stances.").




192. Seeid. at 351.
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"workplace." Whenever an employee and a supervisor/co-employee come
into contact, it belies reason to accept that the contact can be "parsed" into
a variety of factors either negating or validating the existence of an em-
ployment relationship. 193 The link between the employees and the work-
place is a fact that neither party can voluntarily abandon in the course of
contact. For example, a supervisor encountering an employee outside of the
traditional workplace would recognize, even if subconsciously, the work-
place connection. Furthermore, the supervisor would be expected by social
and business custom to engage in small talk and conduct himself profes-
sionally, regardless of where the meeting occurs. Similarly, co-employees
meeting outside the workplace would recognize the employment connec-
tion as well. Although by custom co-employees may not be expected to
conduct themselves according to the same standard of conduct as a supervi-
sor, a co-employee cannot successfully detach words and actions from the
circumstances to confine them to an exclusively personal relationship, as
distinct from an employment relationship. Allowing a court to manipulate
circumstances after the harassing conduct occurs and then divine the non-
presence of an employment relationship leads to artificial distinctions that
may provide the courts with the challenge of legal obfuscation, but never-
theless results in substantial injustice. As the Parrish Court noted, the ef-
fects of harassment, whether inside or outside the office, cannot be isolated
from the workplace. 194 Instead, the effects of harassment permeate the
employment context and may be triggered by another employee's presence
or the workplace itself.' 95
As a result, courts must accept that an employment relationship arises
simply through contact between two employees. Furthermore, the employ-
ment relationship must define the boundaries of the workplace, in which
the "office" serves only as the primary forum for the effects of the relation-
ship to manifest themselves. By accepting that the employment relationship
cannot be voluntarily abandoned when employees interact, courts can in-
stead focus on each employer's role of ending discriminatory conduct
within its control.
2. Application of Current Precedent to an Extended View of Parrish
Courts must consider the current atmosphere of judicial opinion when
determining liability for workplace conduct. Federal courts determining
193. Id. ("The employment relationship cannot be so finely and facilely parsed.").
194. Id. at 352.
195. See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409-10 (1st Cir. 2002)
("[]nteractions... outside of work help explain why [the plaintiff] was so frightened... and why [the
harasser's] constant presence around [the plaintiff] at work created a hostile work environment.").
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whether an employer should be held liable for the acts of supervisors will
instinctively look to the test set out in Ellerth and Faragher. When deter-
mining employer liability for the acts of co-employees, courts will typically
respond by applying the negligence standard used in the circuits. 196 Taking
the extended view of Parrish, that regardless of where the conduct oc-
curred the workplace/employment relationship existed, Ellerth, Faragher,
and the negligence standard act to limit employer liability to matters within
the employer's control. 197 Actions within the employer's control include
promoting of supervisors, creating intake and information gathering sys-
tems for employee misconduct, and training, disciplining, and terminating
employees who may violate the protections of Title VII.198 By preserving
the limit on employer liability under Ellerth, Faragher, or a negligence
standard, courts will achieve Title VII's purpose of eliminating discrimina-
tion in employment without excessive hardship for the employer.
Ellerth and Faragher impute liability to the employer where a super-
visor "with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the em-
ployee" takes a "tangible employment action." 199 Absent a "tangible
employment action," the Court permits the employer to raise an affirmative
defense requiring it to prove that the employer took "reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly" the conduct and that the employee "unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer. ' 200 Employers spend large amounts of time
and money cultivating and vetting employees to take supervisory positions.
These promotions do not, or perhaps should not, involve arbitrary, unin-
formed decisions as to who has the capacity to take on more responsibility.
Employers will typically look at many factors when making promotion
decisions, notably the ability to lead and communicate with others and take
responsibility for not only producing results individually, but collectively
as well. When an employer makes a judgment that an individual possesses
the necessary qualities for promotion to a supervisory role, the employer
vouches for the supervisor as being an eligible spokesperson and executor
of the company's directives. Regardless of a potential urgent need to pro-
mote an employee to supervisor, companies retain the choice of whether to
place a particular person in a supervisory role; thus, the employer entirely
controls who ascends to this position and acts as the company's "agent."
196. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998).
197. See id. at 803.
198. Id. ("[E]mployers have.. . opportunity and incentive to screen [supervisors], train them, and
monitor their performance.").
199. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
200. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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Furthermore, employers expect supervisors to conform to a standard
of conduct that facilitates the smooth flow of business transactions and
reduces aberrations in the company's daily operations. 201 An extended
view of Parrish merges the employer's business and legal obligations by
charging the employer with eliminating and preventing the economic waste
inherent in a hostile work environment. 20 2 Thus, business and legal objec-
tives mutually serve the goals of employers and employees: promoting a
workplace free from the economic waste of harassment, while also preserv-
ing a private right for victims under Title VII. As a result, employers who
satisfy their business obligation by controlling the potential for a hostile
work environment and eliminating it if it exists will meet their legal obliga-
tion, with the benefits of increased productivity and a positive company
image.203
Therefore, the Faragher and Ellerth test for employer liability for the
conduct of a supervisor should remain in place, yet be understood under an
extension of the Parrish logic to encompass interactions between employ-
ees and supervisors regardless of time or location. Therefore, any "tangible
employment action" taken by a supervisor will result in liability, or, if there
was no "tangible employment action," the employer can raise the affirma-
tive defense under Faragher/Ellerth to show that it took efforts to eliminate
any alleged hostility. Employers will suffer no unreasonable burdens by
essentially being held to the standards of sound business judgment. The
consequence of not using sound judgment, however, will extend not just to
the business suffering economic waste, but to potential legal liability as
well. The Faragher/Ellerth standard correctly views employers as having
the most control in avoiding violations of Title VII by being mindful of the
employees they promote and their own economic well-being, with the re-
sulting well-being of employees working in an environment free from hos-
tility.
As the Court noted in Faragher, many circuits hold employers liable
for conduct of a co-employee under a negligence standard. 20 4 Under the
negligence standard, "[w]hen an employee is harassed by a co-worker, the
employer may be held responsible only if 'the employer knew or should
have known about an employee's acts of harassment and fails to take ap-
201. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[A] supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring
a safe, productive workplace.").
202. Cf Posner, supra note 163, at 1321.
203. Cf id.
204. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
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propriate remedial action.' ' 205 Under the extended view of Parrish, a neg-
ligence standard should also remain in place. Holding employers responsi-
ble only for negligence provides sufficient protection for employers, while
also giving them the opportunity to correct any behavior that may lead to a
hostile work environment. Unlike supervisors, co-employees do not share
the ability of a supervisor to create a "tangible employment action" and
may engage in social interactions outside of work more often because they
share a similar standing in the workplace and do not face any perceived
social barrier between boss and employee. 206 Although hostility between
co-employees may result in economic waste equivalent to a supervisor's
creation of a hostile work environment, the employer will be protected by a
higher burden of proof when co-employees are involved because no tangi-
ble employment action may be taken.207 Because the majority of Federal
Courts of Appeal would apply a negligence standard for the conduct of co-
employees, the courts should similarly apply it to discriminatory events that
occur outside the office and involve co-employees.
Once again, employers will not be subject to absolute liability, only a
negligence standard. Holding an employer to a negligence standard should
theoretically result in little objection because the court is only enforcing the
employer's business obligation of eliminating waste within its knowledge.
A suit enforcing employer liability for negligently allowing a hostile work
environment to develop not only serves the interest of the victim in obtain-
ing relief, but it creates a positive, productive work environment. An em-
ployer could hardly scoff at a policy remedying discrimination when the
employer's continued, profitable existence relies on the productivity it fails
to maintain by overlooking such conduct. Therefore, an extended view of
Parrish equally addresses the interests of employers and employees under
Ellerth, Faragher, or a negligence standard, and these tests should continue
to apply wherever the employment relationship between employees results
in a hostile work environment.
3. A Response to Concerns about Expanding the Workplace under
Title VII
In response to potential arguments that employers will be required to
205. McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brooms v. Regal
Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989)).
206. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 ("When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk
away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such responses to a supervi-
sor .... ).
207. See id. at 805 ("[C]ourts have consistently held that acts of supervisors have greater power to
alter the environment than acts of coemployees generally.").
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take costly measures to end discrimination outside the office walls, any
increased costs will be negligible. One argument may be that a more
broadly defined workplace will require more time and effort to inform em-
ployees and supervisors of the new policy. This argument lacks any force
because, essentially, Title VII already requires employers to train and in-
form employees about issues of discrimination in the workplace. A broader
conception of the workplace merely requires employers to explain that the
same policies apply in any interaction between employees regardless of
location, a simple concept to convey. Furthermore, the costs of vetting and
cultivating supervisors will also be slight because the employer is already
cultivating and vetting the supervisor to not discriminate in the office. An
employee predisposed to abstain from discriminatory conduct in the office
will not likely engage in that behavior outside the office; the reverse is also
likely true-that one predisposed to engage in discriminatory conduct in
the office will likely engage in that conduct outside the office as well.
Employers may also argue that responsibility for conduct outside the
workplace will result in an increase in investigative costs. However, this
argument also lacks force. First, a responsible employer will likely investi-
gate any alleged discrimination to determine whether or not it could be held
liable and the possible effect of the conduct in the workplace. Secondly, the
fact that conduct may have occurred outside the office does not mean there
will be no attempt at litigation, and preparatory investigation would be
necessary anyway. Lastly, employers may argue that conduct outside the
workplace is too detached from the employment context. But the fact that
some conduct falls outside the employer's reach is exactly the point of
limiting employer liability to actions within the employer's control under
Faragher, Ellerth, or a negligence standard. While the employer may not
have the ability to prevent all conduct, it bears the responsibility of taking
actions against conduct within its control; this is the employer's role in
achieving Title VII's purpose of eliminating discrimination within the em-
ployment context.
Applying the current rules for employer liability to all conduct and
interactions between employees of the same company, regardless of loca-
tion, does not unfairly extend liability. Rather, it follows current precedent,
which imposes liability for conduct largely within the employer's control.
Furthermore, the employer's exercise of this control will be beneficial in
creating and maintaining a productive workforce. Thus, courts should con-
tinue to apply Ellerth, Faragher, and a negligence standard to the conduct,
but open up their analysis to all interactions between employees. By ad-
dressing conduct outside the workplace under current precedent, courts can
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account for the inescapable logic that the employment relationship between
two employees of the same company cannot be legitimately severed, while
also only imposing vicarious liability on employers for matters within their
control.
CONCLUSION
Currently, arbitrary distinctions between "in the workplace" and "out-
side the workplace" based on traditional concepts of a physical workspace
and work hours serve to protect employers from liability without any sub-
stantive basis. Because some courts still do not consider conduct outside
the workplace when adjudicating a hostile work environment claim, adop-
tion of this policy may lead to a larger quantity of meritorious lawsuits
against employers. However, courts and employers should not view this
issue as only creating more cost for employers; it is an issue about demand-
ing that employers value their workers and dedicate the workplace to eco-
nomic productivity. Extending Parrish would not necessarily set the bar for
liability higher, but it would keep the current bar in place, without validat-
ing a distinction between a hostile work environment created by conduct
inside the workplace, as opposed to one created by conduct outside the
workplace. Limiting hostile work environments to harassment occurring
within a particular building, at a particular time, undercuts each employee's
right to a workplace free from discrimination.
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